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Abstract
This experiment was a first inquiry into the area of 
excuses. What excuses are is unclear, but evidence indi­
cates (Jones & Berglas, 1978; Snyder, 1980) that people make 
excuses in order to evade responsibility. There has not 
been any research that directly faces the question @To what 
extent do people perceive and take into account excuses for 
behavior?@ Excuses are usually thought to be environmental 
factors (Austin, 1961) which can be cited as alternate 
causes for the negative effects of an action. The litera­
ture concerning the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 
1977; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Jones & Nisbett, 1972) indicates 
that observers are unwilling to take into account situ­
ational factors that may have influence on an actor.
An alternate explanation of this tendency to ignore environ­
mental influences has been given by Harvey (1976) and Hamil­
ton (1980). It may be the case, they claim, that the 
@threshold@ for the perception of environmental influence is 
higher when subjects are deciding about the responsibility 
of an actor than it is when the same subjects are deciding 
about the causal antecedents of the effects of an actor’s 
action. This is because attribution of responsibility is 
based on a more restrictive rule (@could have done other- 
wise@ for Hamilton, 1980, and perceived freedom to choose 
the action for Harvey, 1976). Both of these rules refer to 
the strength of the environmental influence or excuse.
There are many different excuses, and one of the dimensions 
that excuses, for the sake of this experiment, were assumed 
to vary on was that of the internal or external locus of the 
excuse. Coercion is, presumably, an externally located 
excuse, Insanity is a presumably internally located excuse, 
while drug use is an excuse that has a questionable locus.
The perceived intention of the actor is another factor that 
influences the perceived strength of the external influence 
(Fincham & Jaspars, 1980). For this reason, a 3(type of 
excuse) x 2 (strength of excuse) x 2 (intention) factorial 
design was used. A control group was included in order to 
assess the effect of the mere presence of an excuse. Sub­
jects watched a videotape in which a news announcer 
described a murder scene in which Mike Johnson had shot sev­
eral students of Central State University by firing at them 
from a rooftop. After the news announcement, the videotape 
showed Mike engaged in a dialogue with his lawyer. It was 
during this dialogue that the manipulations of type of
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excuse, strength of excuse, and intent of the actor took 
place. The control subjects saw only the news announcement.
The intent manipulation was successful, but the success of 
the strength manipulation was spotty, and not statistically 
reliable. There were no effects on attributed legal or 
moral responsibility. Nevertheless, there were significant 
differences among the excuses on probability of conviction, 
severity of recommended sentence, and prediction of the 
future similar behavior on the part of the accused. Coer­
cion was the excuse that offered the most mitigation of 
probability of conviction and severity of sentence. Drugs 
and Insanity were undifferentiated on these two measures. 
Those subjects in the insane condition perceived the actor 
as significantly more likely to commit a similar crime in 
the future than those subjects in both the coercion and 
drugs conditions. These results combined indicate that the 
external excuse (coercion) was the most effective excuse, 
while the internaly located excuse (insanity) was used more 
than the two others to predict future similar behavior.
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Excuses and Responsibility
1
The Effects of Mitigating Circumstances on 
Attributions of Responsibility
"If someone, who is plainly mad to all the
world, acts from an ordinary motive in the
perpetration of an offence, he is presumed to 
have acted sanely, and with full capacity of 
responsibility. No greater mistake could well 
be made."
(Henry Maudsley* Responsibility in Men­
tal Disease, 1897)
For as long as people have been accusing each other of 
wrongful acts, people have been excusing each other (and 
themselves) for their actions. The great English psychia­
trist, Henry Maudsley, rightly recognized that some factors
will change observers1 attitudes about responsibility. By
identifying a motive or a desirable effect of an action, an
observer can increase his confidence that the act was
\
intended (Jones & Davis, 1965). Or, by introducing an 
excuse, an actor can presume to alter the balance between 
personal causality and environmental (or impersonal) causal­
ity (Heider, 1958), thus hopefully changing the assigned 
responsibility for the negative effects of the action (Jones 
& Berglas, 1978). Excuses are important not only because of 
their widespread use by the layman, but also because the law 
will accept certain excuses as valid mitigators of responsi-
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bility, conviction, and sanction. For both these reasons, 
it is suprising that excuses have been neglected in research 
on the assignment of responsibility (Brewer, 1977; Fincham & 
Jaspars, 1980).
There is, however, a long tradition of work on excuses 
in philosophy (Anscombe, 1957; Austin, 1961; Davidson, 1966; 
Nowell-Smith, 1966; Strawson, 1974). In an important arti­
cle dedicated exclusively to this subject, Austin (1961) 
states that excuses are used to deny responsibility for an 
action by relating extenuating circumstances that relieve 
(if only partially) the actor from blame. Excuses, accord­
ing to Austin, run the gamut from full pardon - "My arm was 
bumped" - to little, if any, relief - "I’m so clumsy".
What exactly excuses are is unclear, and in part, this 
paper is intended to explore this issue. It might be better 
to begin with a look at what people expect excuses to do and 
to then speculate about common traits all excuses may share. 
Excuses are made, Austin proposes, in order to evade respon­
sibility. This proposition has been tested (Jones & Berg- 
las, 1978; Snyder, 1980) under the heading of "self-handi­
capping strategies". According to these authors, people 
present excuses for their actions - sometimes even in 
advance of their actions - in order to evade full responsi­
bility. For example, hypochondriacs, when told that their
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performance on a task could be affected by their health, 
reported significantly more health problems than hypochon­
driacs who were told their health was unrelated to their 
performance on the task (Snyder, 1980). Some evidence indi­
cates, then, that people do try to avoid responsibility by 
offering excuses. This research is concerned, however, only 
with the offering of excuses and not the acceptance of them. 
The success of self-handicapping strategies as evidenced by 
reductions in observer's attributions of responsibility has 
not been addressed in this literature. The process by which 
attributions of responsibility are mitigated in the presence 
of excuses is still unclear.
An indication of the possible types of process is given 
by another philosopher. Strawson (1974) makes a connection 
between a victim's feelings of resentment at being wronged 
or an observer's vicarious resentment of a wrong perpetrated 
upon another, and the attributions of responsibility that we 
make toward those who perpetrate those wrongs. A person's 
need to attribute responsibility to others is a function of 
our moral (by which Strawson means "emotive") reactions to 
the wrong. A victim of a crime can react in at least two 
ways to the offending person. The victim may analyze the 
reasons and motives of the offender, and take account of the 
mitigating circumstances, thereby coming to a conclusion
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about the antecedent sources of the crime. On the other 
hand, the victim will certainly feel some resentment that 
his or her rights have been violated. The two modes of 
reaction to a wrongful act, the rational analytic mode and 
the reactive moralistic mode, may well be simultaneous reac­
tions or one may occur without the other. Strawson states 
that attribution of responsibility is based largely on 
"reactive" processes that differ from scientific assessment 
of the situation. By contrast, acceptance of an excuse 
implies not a reactive process, but a process that seeks 
environmental influences, alternative causes, and mitigating 
circumstances.
What, then, makes excuses effective mitigators of 
responsibility and its counterparts? The perceived sources 
of an action1s effects are divided into two broad catagories 
by Heider (1958) - personal causality (the effect is caused 
by the person) and impersonal causality (the effect is 
caused by something other than the person. It is in imper­
sonal causality - which, disregarding difficult cases, may 
be called environmental influence - that we may find the 
source of excuses. The levels of responsibility attribution 
are said by Heider to be "successive stages in which attri­
bution to the person decreases and attribution to the envi­
ronment increases" (Heider, 1958, p. 113). A look at the
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five levels of responsibility attribution proposed by Shaw & 
Sulzer (1964) will show that as the level of attribution 
increases from association, through causality, foreseeabil­
ity, intentionality, and finally to justifiability, the num­
ber and variability of acceptable excuses that could be 
offered also increases. An ascription of responsibility 
that relies on association will allow for little or no 
excuse. If the accused was in any way associated with the 
action, he or she is responsible regardless of extenuating 
circumstances. An ascription of responsibility that relies 
on foreseeability allows the accused to plead that the 
action's consequences were not foreseeable. An ascription 
of responsibility that relies on justifiability allows the 
accused to cite a host of environmental influences to excuse 
him or herself (Heider, 1958). This implies that the effec­
tiveness of excuses lies in their modification of the per­
ceived "relative contribution of environmental factors to 
the action outcome" (Heider, 1958, p. 113). That is, the 
more environmental influence an observer perceives to oper­
ate in the production of an effect, the more that environ­
mental influence should "excuse" the actor from being con­
sidered the sole producer of the effect. This is very 
similar to a discounting effect (Kelley, 1973) in that the 
presence of an environmental explanation should reduce the
Excuses and Responsibility
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credence given to the actor as the sole cause of the effect.
An empirical question that could, at this point, be 
asked, is "To what extent do people perceive and take into 
account situational factors?" The answer to this question 
should incorporate the value and mode of operation of 
excuses. Experimental evidence indicates that the observers 
of an actor are more likely to identify something about the 
actor as the source of the action, while actors are more 
likely to identify something about the situation as the 
source for their action (see Jones and Nisbett, 1971, for an 
early review and Nisbett & Ross, 1980, for a more recent 
one). A study by Nisbett and Caputo (cited in Jones <& Nis­
bett, 1971) is a good example of the tendency of observers 
to overattribute the sources of an action to the actor. In 
this study subjects were asked to describe why they and 
their best friends had chosen their respective majors: When
explaining their own actions, the subjects listed about the 
same number of stimulus reasons (something about the major) 
as person reasons (something about themselves); when 
explaining the behavior of their friends, the subjects 
listed three times as many person reasons as stimulus rea­
sons. Other studies (Bierbrauer, 1973; Jones & Harris, 
1967; Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968; Nis­
bett, Caputo, Legant, & Maracek, 1973; Storms, 1973) also
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substantiate the effect.
The tendency of observers to ignore powerful situ­
ational determinants of behavior has been called the "funda­
mental attribution error" by Ross (1977) because he thinks a 
disregard for situational factors is not an accurate repre­
sentation of the true determinants of the actor's behavior. 
He proposes that the tendency to attribute actions to per­
sonal reasons is an error in judgement and not what a truly 
rational man would do. The experimental evidence, then, 
answers "Not much." to the question "To what extent do peo­
ple take into account situational factors?" and most exper­
imenters propose that this disregard for situational expla­
nations is an error on the part of the observers. The 
weight of the evidence suggests that dispositional sources 
are still more salient to observers than are situational 
factors, while the reverse is true for actors' perceptions 
of their own behavior.
Other theorists (Hamilton, 1980; Harvey, 1976) state 
that what Ross (1977) calls overattribution to the actor is 
not an error, but is actually an alternative decision rule 
that is different in process from assigning sources of 
behavior. When subjects "overattribute" an action to the 
actor, Hamilton claims that, in many instances, they are 
actually deciding whether or not the actor "could have done
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otherwise” and mainly engaged in assigning responsibility to 
the actor on the basis of this rule.
In order to make this point, Hamilton describes two 
models of the attribution process, the scientific, "intui­
tive psychologist" model (based on Kelley’s 1973 covaria­
tion principle) and the legal "intuitive laywer" model 
(based on Jones & Davis' 1965 correspondent inference 
theory) . This distinction is not unlike the one made by 
Strawson (1974) between scientific and reactive models of 
behavior. When subjects are attempting to infer the causes 
of behavior, states Hamilton, then one may speak truthfully 
of a fundamental attribution error, but when subjects are 
deciding about responsibility and sanctions, the fundamental 
attribution error is not applicable. When subjects are mak­
ing judgments about responsibility, they are interested, 
says Hamilton, in what the rational man would do. They are 
concerned with whether the rational man could have done oth­
erwise in the situation than did the real actor. If the 
rational man could have done otherwise, then the actor 
should be expected to have done otherwise also. Therefore, 
if observers are ascribing responsibility, the tendency to 
overattribute to the actor is not an error. The rule of 
"could have done otherwise" is only concerned with environ­
mental influences if they could conceivably override the
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choice of the person. If these external causal forces are 
not irresistible, if a rational man could have been expected 
to ignore or overcome them, then they are not counted as 
significant influences on the action and will therefore not 
be acceptable excuses. Mere influence is not enough. A 
"scientific” analysis of an action, states Hamilton, should 
take into account small influences by the environment, but a 
"legal" analysis need not be concerned with environmental 
influence until it is overwhelming. The stronger a per­
ceived causal force the excuse is, the more effective miti- 
gator of responsibiilty it should be. However, the per­
ceived causal force of the excuse need not be linearly 
related to mitigation of responsibility, mitigation could 
occur only at high levels of perceived causal force and low 
levels of causal force could be ineffective in producing 
mitigation. It could be that the threshold for the percep­
tion of environmental influence is lower for subjects doing 
causal attribution than it is for subjects doing responsi­
bility attribution. Conceivably then, the perceived 
strength of the excusing circumstance should affect its 
ability to mitigate responsibility attributed to the actor.
Social psychologists should, states Hamilton, be more 
careful in assuming what it is subjects are attempting to do 
when they interpret a social situation. Often, subjects are
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lay scientists and are attempting to make veridical state­
ments about the dispositions of other persons. On the other 
hand, observers may well be attempting to determine the 
responsibility of an actor for an effect the actor has 
already produced. When this is the case, subjects may be 
correctly interested in the valence of the act and less 
interested in environmental forces. Certainly if the exter­
nal, environmental forces are so great that the actor was 
forced to commit the act, an observer should not hold the 
actor responsible. But, if the actor could have chosen 
another action, and instead picked this one, the observer 
can, with some degree of confidence, hold him responsible. 
It would seem, then, that the more choices an individual has 
in a situation, the more responsible that individual can be 
held for his action. ,
An objection to the idea of a fundamental attribution 
error was made before Hamilton's (1980) paper in an article 
by Harvey (1976). It is suprising that Hamilton does not 
refer to Harvey's theoretical or experimental work, for both 
writers seem to be saying much the same thing. Simply put, 
Harvey states that actors will claim little freedom in order 
to avoid sanctions, while observers will attribute perceived 
freedom in order to apply sanctions. Thus, actors will 
state that they felt they had little choice in deciding to
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perform an action (in order to avoid sanctions) while 
observers will state that the actor had much freedom of 
choice (in order to apply sanctions). This difference in 
perception of freedom will result in the same sort of dif­
ference that Ross (1977) calls an attributional error, and 
is eminently rational when viewed from this perspective. In 
order to test this proposition, Harvey, Harris, & Barnes 
(1975) had actors give ”shocks" to accomplices of the exper­
imenter while observers watched. They found that observers 
attributed more freedom to refuse, and more choice in com­
pleting the job (shocking the accomplice) than did actors. 
Harvey reasons that this difference is the result of the 
observer's desire to apply sanctions to the actors and the 
actor's desire to avoid those sanctions. Here again there 
is an alternative interpretation of the actor - observer 
difference that is not based on causal analysis, but is con­
cerned with the application of sanctions. These results 
imply that observers may be less receptive to excuses for 
actions than are actors in that observers perceive more 
ability to choose on the part of the actor and less influ­
ence of the environment.
The attributional behavior of subjects can be explained 
in terms of the desire of observers to ascribe responsibil­
ity and apply sanctions and the corresponding desire of
Excuses and Responsibility
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actors to avoid both responsibility and sanctions. The 
attribution of responsibility and the application of sanc­
tions are, though related, two different things and they may 
vary as a function of the stimulus situations that evoke 
them (Fincham <& Jaspars, 1980). Their status as alternative 
explanations for a fundamental attribution error is one fac­
tor among many that they share in common.
Both Hamilton (1980) and Harvey (1976) offer alterna­
tive explanations of the actor observer differences that do 
not imply a cognitive error on the part of the observers. 
The concept of "could have done otherwise" certainly seems 
similar to the concept of freedom of choice. As the number 
of perceived options is reduced, the perceived amount of 
choice should be curtailed and along with it the perceived 
freedom of the actor to do as he or she chooses. Can one 
then conclude that the two alternative explanations are 
speaking of the same concept? It certainly seems so, but 
two logically related concepts may or may not be related 
phenomenally to each other. Perceived freedom, (i.e., phe­
nomenal freedom) may not be the same thing as the perception 
of whether or not the actor could have done otherwise. If 
they vary independently of one another, they could respond 
differentially to the perceived intent of the actor and the 
perceived strength of environmental factors.
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The ability to choose one action rather than another 
("could have done otherwise"), the perceived freedom of an 
individual, and the balance of power between the individual 
and the environment are all interrelated. The balance of 
power between the environment and the person is the basis 
for Heider's (1958) scale of levels of responsibility attri­
bution. This balance, in turn, should affect the amount of 
perceived freedom and the perceived ability to choose one 
action instead of another. Perceived freedom and perceived 
ability to choose the action, should, in turn, affect the 
salience and mitigating power of an excuse. The experimen­
tal evidence (Harvey, 1976; Harvey, Harris & Barnes, 1975) 
indicates that this effect is attenuated by the desire of 
observers to apply sanctions, but if, as philosophers imply, 
excuses do have some effect, this effect should be mediated 
through the strength of the environmental force exerted on 
the actor. Thus, it appears that the strength oft the envi­
ronmental force is a major consideration in the effective­
ness of an excuse.
A look at Austin's (1961) examples of excuses will show 
another characteristic of excuses that might affect their 
ability to mitigate responsibility. The two excuses men­
tioned above were "My arm was bumped" and "I'm so clumsy". 
One difference between these two excuses is that one has an
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external, environmental source, and the other has an inter­
nal, dispositional source. It seems reasonable to suppose 
that excuses which are more externally based will have 
greater effect in changing the balance of personal (inter­
nal) and impersonal (external) causality. An excuse that 
finds its source in an internal disposition (clumsiness, 
stupidity, emotional weakness, etc.) may be harder for 
observers to identify as an impersonal cause for an action 
than an excuse that calls on external sources (coercion by 
another person, being pushed, etc.). There are, of course, 
gray areas: alcohol abuse or drug abuse, provocation (He
hit me first), etc. It is possible that the usefulness of 
an excuse will depend partially on whether the excuse origi­
nates from an internal or an external source.
This paper has concentrated so far on attributes of the 
environment that might affect perceptions of responsibility. 
And rightly so, for the basis of an excuse is in the envi­
ronmental force that it could exert on the actor. There is, 
however, another variable that is mentioned by Fincham & 
Jaspars (1980) that may affect the perceptions of the 
strength of the excuse. They state that as the perceived 
intention of an actor increases, the perceived influence or 
strength of effect of any environmental factors should 
decrease. They have gleaned this prediction from the legal
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understanding of the condition of mens rea, or guilty mind. 
A person with a guilty mind is one who has "purposely, know­
ingly, recklessly, or negligently" (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980) 
committed an act. This is established, according to Fincham 
<Sc Jaspers, using a discounting procedure. In other words, 
the perceived intentionality of an action is the inverse of 
the perceived environmental influence. It is not certain, 
and Fincham & Jaspers give no hints about, whether it is 
intentionality that is discounted because of environmental 
influence, or if rather, environmental influence is dis­
counted because of perceived intention. In this case, then, 
it would pay to manipulate both perceived environmental 
influence and perceived intention and observe their effects 
on attributions of freedom, ability to choose, and responsi­
bility.
This experiment was concerned with manipulating both 
perceived intention of the actor and the perceived strength 
of the excuse (the proposed environmental influence). As 
mentioned above, the type of excuse used for an action may 
well alter the effectiveness of that excuse. For this rea­
son, three types of excuses were used - an excuse with a 
presumably external locus of causality (coercion), an excuse 
with a questionable locus of causality (drugs), and an 
excuse with a presumably internal locus of causality (insan-
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ity) . There was also a manipulation of strength of the 
environmental influence (strength of the excuse) in which 
the excuse was presented as either overwhemingly strong or 
as weak. In order to control for the intent of the actor 
(Fincham & Jaspers, 1980), perceived intent of the actor was 
also manipulated, so that the actor appeared to have either 
intended the action or to have not intended it.
It was hypothesized that the pattern of responses to 
questions about responsibility would differ from the pattern 
of responses to questions concerning dispositional attribu­
tions (in this case measured by predicted future actions of 
the actor). This would indicate that attributing responsi­
bility and attributing dispositions invlove different pro­
cesses. Further, those subjects in the high strength of 
excuse condition should attribute less responsibility, less 
probability of conviction, and recommend less severe sen­
tencing than those in the low strength condition. Those 
subjects in the high intent condition should attribute more 
responsibility, more probability of conviction, and recom­
mend more severe sentencing then those in the low intent 
condition. It was also hypothesized that the externally 
located excuse would produce more mitigation of responsibil­
ity, conviction, and sentencing than the internally located 
excuse, while also producing less perceived probability that
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the actor would commit a similar act in the future.
Most of the other predictions that can be found in the 
literature can be phrased as correlational predictions. 
Perceived strength of the excuse and perceived intent of the 
actor should be negatively correlated (Fincham <Sc Jaspars, 
1980). Perceived freedom of the actor to choose and per­
ceived amount that the actor "could have done otherwise" 
should both correlate positively with responsibility, con­
viction, and severity of sentencing.
Method
Subj ects
Subjects were 68 males and 76 females enrolled in an 
Introductory Psychology class at the College of William & 
Mary. They received class credit for their participation. 
Subjects were run in groups according to which cell of the 
experiment they had been assigned. Each cell was run only 
once, and the size of each cell ranged from 8 to 14. 
Independent Variables
As mentioned above, three types of excuses were used - 
an excuse with an assumed external locus of causality (coer­
cion), an excuse with an assumed questionable locus of cau­
sality (drugs), and an excuse with an assumed internal locus 
of causality (insanity). Insanity was chosen as the inter-
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nal locus excuse because, though it is presumably inflicted 
on an unwilling person, it may prove difficult for subjects 
to separate the insanity from the insane person. Coercion 
by another person was chosen as the external locus excuse 
because, though it is separate from the actor, it requires 
some overt action on the part of the actor. Drugs were cho­
sen as the questionable locus excuse because, in an informal 
pretest, that excuse was believed more readily than the 
excuse of alcohol. Crossed with this type of excuse factor 
was a manipulation of the strength of the excuse. This 
strength factor had two levels, strong and weak. Within 
each cell of these conditions, half of the subjects learned 
that the actor had contemplated the action before (high 
intention) while half of the subjects heard the actor deny 
any premeditation of the act (low intention). Finally, a 
control group was also included that received none of these 
manipulations in order to determine if there were any miti­
gating effects for just the presence of an excuse. This 
resulted in a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design with a control 
group.
Stimulus Materials
Stimulus materials were videotapes of an interview, 
ostensibly between a laywer and his client. The viewer 
looked over the lawyer's shoulder and at the accused. There
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was only one light on the set, and that was behind the 
accused, creating a silhouette so that the actor’s facial 
features could not be easily discerned. The videotapes were 
in color, and were from four to five minutes in length. The 
first section of the film contained a news announcement by a 
commentator. The commentator informed the viewers that the 
accused was a computer programmer for Central State Univer­
sity, and had been fired from his job about two weeks before 
the interview occured. He also explained that the accused 
had, two days before the present interview, climbed atop one 
of the campus buildings of Central State University and 
begun firing into the students changing classes.
The commentator then stated that the forthcoming inter­
view was between the accused Mike Johnson and his lawyer. 
The interview began with a monologue by Mike Johnson that 
contained the manipulation of the type of excuse and its 
strength. During this monologue, Mike mentioned his wife 
and also indicated that he thought that he should not have 
been fired from his job. In the coerced condition, Mike 
stated that he was forced to shoot the people by the "Peo­
ple' s Liberation Front" who had either threatened to bomb 
his house (low strength) or kidnapped his wife (high 
strength). In the drugs condition, Mike pleaded that 
because of his depression he had taken a few drugs, but
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still remembered his actions (low strength) or that he had 
taken 111 don’t know how many or what kind" of drugs and 
could remember very little of the incident (high strength). 
In the insane condition, Mike stated that he had suffered a 
"mental break" but was "perfectly fine now" (low strength) 
or that his mental break was so severe as to impede his 
present functioning (high strength). In the ensuing dia­
logue, the manipulation of intent took place. In the high 
intention condition, Mike showed little regret for his 
action and stated that "the bastards in the administration 
need something to shake them up". In the low intent condi­
tion, Mike was obviously contrite and said that he would 
"never think of doing something like that just to get back 
at the administration". Other responses of Mike varied 
across the conditions, and the complete scripts can be found 
in Appendix A. The dialogue was, except for the intent 
manipulation, substantially the same for each cell of the 
design.
Dependent Measures
The dependent measures consisted of eleven questions 
about the following perceptions or judgments: perceived
strength of the excuse, perceived intention of the actor, 
possibility that the actor "could have done otherwise", per­
ceived freedom of the actor to decide, moral and legal
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responsibility of the actor, probability that the actor 
would "do the same sort of thing again”, likelihood that the 
subject would convict that actor of the crime, recommended 
severity of the sentence, amount of responsibility that the 
actor felt for the action, and the likelihood that the actor 
would have done the action if the excuse not had any effect. 
The subjects provided their responses to the questions on 
nine point scales with higher scores in each case indicating 
more of the variable measured. The actual measures used can 
be found in Appendix B.
Procedure
When all the subjects had arrived for a session, Exper­
imenter 1 told them that the purpose of the study was to 
investigate perceptions of televised courtroom situations, 
and the subjects were asked to sign forms indicating their 
voluntary consent to participate. After all the consent 
forms were collected, the tape was presented. Again, the 
tape consisted of a short introductory news comment and then 
the interview. Subjects in the control condition received 
only the news comment and therefore did not receive any of 
the manipulations of type of excuse, strength of excuse, or 
intent. The order of presentation of the tapes was randomly 
determined. When the tape was over, Experimenter 2 (who was 
blind to the hypotheses of the study) turned the tape off,
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explained the dependent measures, and told the subjects to 
begin filling them out. When the subjects had given their 
responses, the questionnaires were collected, and the sub­
jects were thoroughly debriefed by Experimenter 1.
Results
Data were analyzed with a 3 (excuse) x 2 (intent) x 2 
(strength) analysis of variance with a control group. Fur­
ther analysis was done within each excuse as a 2 (intent) x 
2 (strength) analysis of variance. This method of analysis 
will slightly inflate the error rate in each 2 x 2  analysis 
(Kirk, 1968) as a function of the number of F tests per­
formed. There are several ways to correct for this increase 
of Type I error, but none that is universally accepted. One 
method involves lowering alpha from .05 to a smaller value, 
but this method is indiscriminate in selection of those dif­
ferences considered significant. For this reason, the .05 
level of significance will be used, but exact probability 
levels will be reported with the F values so that the reader 
may judge the reliability of the reported F value. Average 
correlations (Guilford & Fruchter, 1973) were also computed 
between each pair of the eleven dependent measures. Fish­
er's r to z' transformation was used to test for selected
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differences between these correlations (see Kirk, 1978). 
Control Group
All the dependent measures reported here are on a scale 
of 1 to 9. Given this as the largest possible range, it is 
interesting that many of the ranges of the measures were 
high (5 to 9). Table 1 shows the frequency distributions of 
the nine dependent measures given to the control group.
Insert Table 1 about here
Two of the original eleven measures (strength of excuse and 
excuse effect) were ommited because the stimuli shown to the 
control group contained no information about any possible 
excuses available to the actor.
The standard deviations(of the measures in the control 
condition were: perceived intent of the actor (SD = 2.33),
amount of choice (SD = 1.84), perceived freedom (SD = 2.31), 
moral responsibility (SD = 2.12), prediction of a future 
similar action (SD = 1.86), conviction (SD = 1.07), sanction 
(SD = 1.27), personal sense of resonsibility (SD = 1.65), 
legal responsibility (SD = 0.75).
The control condition was tested against the combined 
means of all the experimental groups and no significant dif-
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ferences were found on the nine dependent variables that 
could be tested.
Manipulation Checks
Intent. In order to check for perceived intent of the 
actor, the subjects were asked "How likely is it that Mike 
intended to do what he did?" The main effect for the intent 
condition was significant, F (1, 121) = 5.90, p = .017. The
high intent subjects perceived the stimulus person as having 
intended the action more (M =4.86) than the low intent sub­
jects (M = 3.89). The interaction between excuse and intent 
was not significant, F (1,38) = 1.45, p = .239. The means 
for the manipulation checks can be found in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
Strength. Subjects were also asked to rate the 
strength of the excuse by answering the question "How much 
influence did the drugs (insanity, or fear of the terro­
rists) have over Mike’s actions?" The difference among 
these means was not significant, F (1, 121) = 2.04, p =
.156. Normally, when there is no main effect, it is consid­
ered improper to test for simple effects (Kirk, 1968). But 
since the strength manipulation was central to this study,
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and also since the strength manipulations for each excuse 
were different, the 2 x 2  analyses within excuses were still 
performed. It should be remembered that any significant 
differences in these post hoc tests may be due to random 
variation. In the subsequent analyses, the difference for 
strength was significant in the coerced condition, F (1, 38) 
= 5.75, p = .022, with the subjects in the strong excuse 
condition rating the influence of the excuse as higher (M = 
7.75), than did those subjects in the low strength condition 
(M = 6.63).
This same difference held for the drugs condition (high 
strength: M = 5.60, low strength: M = 5.13). The differ­
ence in the insane conditions was not in the same direction, 
but was negligible: (high strength: M = 7.10; low strength:
M = 7.20). The excuse x strength interaction was not sig­
nificant, F (2, 121) = 1.19, p = .306.
Strength Index. A strength index was computed by subtract­
ing the excuse effect from the perceived strength of the 
excuse. The excuse effect is the perceived likelihood that 
the actor would have performed the action if the excuse not 
had any effect. The excuse effect was obtained by having 
the subjects respond to the question "Assuming that Mike had 
not been at all afraid of the terrorists (emotionally unsta-
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ble, or had not taken any drugs at all) what is the 
likelihood that Mike would have shot the people anyway?" 
There were no significant effects on the strength index in 
the overall analysis. Again, because of the importance of 
the strength manipulation in this study, a 2 x 2 analysis 
was done within each excuse. There were significant differ­
ences in the strength index in subsequent analyses in the 
drugs condition, F(l, 45) = 4.21, p = .046, and in the
insanity condition, F(l, 38) = 6.59, p = .014. In the
coerced condition, the mean for the high strength group was 
-1.53, while that of the low strength group was -1.93. The 
same direction held for the insanity condition, with the 
mean for the high condition being -.62 and that of the low 
condition being -2.05. The drugs condition did not evidence 
the same direction ( high strength: M = -2.40; low
strength: M = -3.56). The strength x excuse interaction,
however, was not significant, F (2, 121) = 1.04, p = .308.
Responsibility Measures
Moral and Legal Responsibility. In light of the dif­
ferences to be reported for conviction, severity of sanc­
tion, and prediction of the actor's future behavior, it is 
interesting that there were no significant effects for 
either moral or legal responsibility in either the overall
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analysis or the subsequent 2 x 2 analyses.
The overall means for each of these measures were above 
the midpoint of the possible range with the mean for moral 
responsibility = 6.64, and the mean for legal responsibility 
= 7.35. The overall standard deviations for the two meas­
ures were: moral responsibility (SD = 2.22) and legal
responsibility (SD = 2.06). There was a dramatic difference 
between the two variables in the shape of the distribution, 
with the kurtosis for legal responsibility being 2.07 and 
the kurtosis for moral responsibility being only .33 (the 
higher the kurtosis value, the more sharply peaked the dis­
tribution of scores). This suggests that moral responsibil­
ity varied more widely among the conditions than did legal 
responsibility.
Personal sense of responsibilty. When subjects we re 
asked "How responsible do you think Mike feels for shooting 
the people?" there were several significant differences. 
This appeared as a significant main effect in the intention 
factor, F (1, 121) = 22.09, p = .000, with subjects in the 
high intent condition perceiving that the stimulus person 
felt less responsible than did those subjects in the low 
intent condition. These means were 4.71 for low intent 
(higher numbers mean more perceived sense of personal 
responsibility) and 2.97 for high intent. This dependent
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variable was also involved in an excuse x strength interac­
tion, F (2, 121) = 3.30, p = .040. The subjects perceived
that the accused felt less responsible under the high 
strength condition than under the low strength condition, 
but only for the person who pleaded insanity. This interac­
tion is pictured in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here
This difference did not show up in any of the other excuses. 
There was also a significant excuse x strength x intention 
interaction in this variable, F (2, 121) = 4.53, p = .013. 
Most of this interaction can be seen to occur within low 
intent and across the three excuse conditions. This three 
way interaction is pictured in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 about here
For the low intent, high strength condition, there was a 
steady decrease in perceived sense of responsibility from 
coercion to drugs to insanity. The low intent, high 
strength means, across the excuse conditions were: coercion
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(5.55), drugs (4.09), and insanity (2.75). This trend was 
reversed in the low intention, low strength condition - but 
only for insanity. These means were: coercion (4.72). drugs 
(4.23), and insanity (6.70). Only in the condition in which 
the accused pleaded insanity, the low strength of excuse and 
low intention conditions led to more perceived consciousness 
of personal responsibility than did high strength of excuse 
and low intention. The means for perceived personal sense 
of responsibility, legal and moral responsibility can be 
found in Table 3.
Insert Table 3 about here
Sanctions
Conviction. Subjects were also asked "If you were a 
jury member, how likely would you be to convict Mike?" 
There was a main effect for excuse on probability of convic­
tion, F (2, 121) = 3.60, p = .030. Coercion was perceived 
as the best excuse (M = 6.63), while drugs and insanity were 
undifferentiated: M = 7.62 and M = 7.20 respectively
(higher numbers mean higher probability of conviction). A 
test between means collapsed across the other 2 conditions 
substantiates this, yielding a significant difference 
between coercion and the combined effect of drugs and insan-
Excuses and Responsibility
30
ity, F (1,120) = 17.00, p = .000 (see Winer, 1962, p. 209), 
while the test between drugs and insanity was not signifi­
cant, F (1,120) = 1.24, p = .268. These two tests were 
orthogonal to each other. Interestingly, there was not a 
difference between the low intent, high strength, insane, 
and the low intent, low strength, insane, to correspond to 
the large difference mentioned above in sense of personal 
responsibility.
Sentencing. Subjects were also asked "How severe a 
sentence would you recommend for Mike?" For severity of 
sentence applied, there was, again, a main effect for type 
of excuse, F (2, 121) = 3.98, p = .021. In parallel with
the results on probablility of conviction, the excuse pro­
ducing the least severity of sentence was coercion, M = 
5.27, while drugs and insanity were not differentially 
effective, with means of 6.33 and 5.95 respectively. This 
claim is substantiated by the nonsignificance of the test 
for a difference between the drugs and insanity condition, F
(1,120) = -97, p = .327, and the significance of the test of 
the combined means for drugs and insanity against the mean 
of the coerced condition, F (1,120) = 15.82, p = .000.
These tests were orthogonal to each other. The means for 
conviction, severity of sentence, amount of perceived 
choice, and prediction of future behavior may be seen in
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Table 4.
Insert Table 4 about here
Predictability Measures
Could have done otherwise. There were also some sig­
nificant differences in response to the question "How possi­
ble is it that Mike could have done something other than 
shoot the people?". For this dependent measure, there was 
an interaction, F (2, 121) = 3.32, p = .039, between type of 
excuse and amount of intention. For both insanity and coer­
cion, the subjects perceived more availability of choice in 
the low intention condition condition than in the high 
intention condition. The pattern for drugs, however, was 
different. In the drugs condition, the pattern was 
reversed, so that subjects in the low intention condition 
perceived more availability of choice and subjects in the 
high intention condition perceived less. Means for this 
group were 7.87 and 6.66 respectively. This interaction is 
pictured in Figure 3.
Insert Figure 3 about here
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Prediction measure. There were relatively strong 
effects across type of excuse and intent when subjects were 
asked "'How probable is it that Mike would do the same sort 
of thing again?" The effect in the excuse condition, F (2, 
121) = 5.90, p =.004, was mainly due to a large increase in 
prediction for the insane condition (M = 6.20) in contrast 
to the small difference between coercion and drugs: M =
4.51 and 4.81 respectively. This is substantiated by the 
nonsignificance of the test between the means of coercion 
and drugs, F (1, 120) = .416, p = .520, and the significance 
of the test of the combined means of coercion and drugs 
against that of insanity, F (1,120) = 7.58, p = .007. These 
tests were orthogonal to each other. Thus, the person 
pleading insanity was perceived as more likely to commit a 
similar crime than those pleading either coercion or intoxi­
cation. The effect for intention, F (1, 121) = 10.30, p =
.002, was such that subjects in the low intention group per­
ceived the person to be less likely to commit a similar 
crime again (M = 4.45) than did those subjects in the high 
intention condition (M = 5.79). It is interesting in light 
of the strong effects for prediction, conviction, and sanc­
tion, that there were no significant differences in either 
moral or legal responsibility.
Excuse effect. This was a measure of the likelihood
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that the accused would have committed the act without the 
effect of the excuse. In order to assess this, subjects 
were asked ’’Assuming that Mike had not been at all afraid of 
the terrorists (emotionaly unstable, or had not taken any 
drugs at all) what is the likelihood that Mike would have 
shot the people anyway?” There were main effects on this 
measure for both type of excuse and intent. The main effect 
for excuse, F (2, 121) = 10.70, p = .000, was concentrated
in the difference between the drugs condition and the other 
two levels. The mean value for drugs was 4.49, while 
coerced was 3.21 and insane was 2.80. That the difference 
was mainly because of the drugs condition is substantiated 
by the significance of the test between the combined means 
of coercion and insanity against the mean of the drugs con­
dition, F (1,120) = 38.78, p = .000. In addition to this 
test, its orthogonal pair, the difference between the 
coerced and the insane condition, was not significant, F
(1,120) = .32, p = .523.
There was also a main effect for intent, F (1, 121) =
25.5, p = .000. Those subjects in the high intent condition 
perceived the accused as more likely to have commited the 
act (M = 4.30) than did those in the low intent condition (M 
= 2.73).
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Relationships among measures
Because most of the hypotheses forwarded by theorists 
in this area are correlational in nature, it was of interest 
to inspect correlations among the dependent measures. All 
of the correlations reported in this section were computed 
on the entire sample (N = 144). The only exceptions to this 
case were those correlations involving the perceived 
strength of the excuse (N = 133), because this question 
could not be asked of the control group. Average correla­
tions are reported (Guilford & Fructer, 1973) because they 
more correctly represent the overall correlations without 
regard to experimental effects. These average correlations 
retained the same pattern evidenced by the unmodified over­
all correlations, but most of the correlations improved. 
Probabilities associated with these correlations are 
reported conventionally, because most of them were below the 
.01 level of significance, and would be unaffected by a low­
ering of the alpha to .03. Perceived strength of excuse and 
perceived intent were negatively correlated, r = -.43, p < 
.001, as Fincham and Jaspars (1980) predict. As Harvey 
(1976) predicts, perceived freedom to choose was positively 
correlated with moral and legal responsibility, r = .44, p < 
.001 and r = .49, p < .001 respectively. Freedom to choose 
the action was also positively correlated with probability
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of conviction and severity of sentencing, r = .52, p < .001 
and r = .50, p < .001 respectively. Whether or not the
accused "could have done otherwise" (Hamilton, 1980) was 
also correlated with probability of conviction, r = .64, p < 
.001, and with severity of sentencing, r = .43, p < .001,
but was less strongly related to moral and legal responsi­
bility, r = .26, p < .01 and r = .23, p < .01. These two
dependent measures of freedom to choose and "could have done 
otherwise" could be considered as the same concept (though 
their correlation was low: r = .38 p < .01). It would be
helpful, then, to determine whether they correlated-differ­
ently with moral and legal responsibilty. The correlation 
of perceived freedom with legal responsibility was signifi­
cantly greater than that of "could have done otherwise" with 
legal responsibility, z = -1.84, p < .05. The correlation
of perceived freedom with moral responsibility was greater 
than that of "could have done otherwise" with moral respon­
sibility, but the difference was not significant, z = -1.30, 
p = .095.
The most startling result was the complete lack of cor­
relation between either of the responsibility measures and 
the prediction measure. Moral responsibility failed to cor­
relate with prediction that the accused would do similar 
acts in the future, r = -.06, p > .15. Legal responsibility
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also had no correlation with predictions that the accused 
would commit similar acts in the future, r = .09, p > .15.
Discussion
It is evident from these results that different excuses 
are differentially effective in mitigating probability of 
conviction and severity of punishment. For both of these 
measures, coercion was perceived as the excuse offering the 
largest amount of mitigation. This is in line with the pre­
dictions stated earlier that excuses that are externally 
located are the best mitigators. Given the lack of signifi­
cant difference between the control condition and the exper­
imental group, it cannot be said that giving any excuse will 
reduce probability of conviction or reduce severity of pun­
ishment. The frequency distributions of the variables in 
the control condition (see Table 1) evidenced wide variation 
of response for each measure. It might, therefore, be pos­
sible to identify people (depending upon attitudinal fac­
tors) that are more willing to accept excuses than others.
The central question of this study may be phrased "To 
what extent do observers take into account situational fac­
tors in the form of excuses, and what is it about excuses 
that mediates this effect?" Given the significant differ­
ences in conviction, sentencing, and prediction of future
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behavior, it is obvious that there were different effects of 
the excuse depending upon which excuse was invoked. The 
mediating factor may well be what Heider (1958, p. 113) 
calls the "relative contribution of environmental factors to 
the action outcome". Less responsibility, and therefore 
supposedly less sanction, is attributed as the balance 
between personal and environmental force tips in the favor 
of the environment. It should be remembered that one of the 
excuses in this study (coercion) was externally located, 
while another (insanity) was internally located. Excuses 
that find their source in the external environment should 
"distance" the action and its effects from the actor better 
than those excuses whose source is internal to the actor. 
This study provides experimental evidence to that effect. 
Probability of conviction, predictions that the accused 
would do a similar action again and severity of sentencing 
responded in accordance with the predictions made concerning 
the effectiveness of externally located excuses as opposed 
to internally located excuses. Those excuses that are 
"inseparable" from the actor should provide the least 
excuse, increase predictions that the actor would commit the 
action again, and do the least to mitigate probability of 
conviction and severity of sanction.
The large difference in predictions of future similar
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actions for actors pleading insanity when compared to either 
drugs or coercion certainly suggests subjects had difficulty 
separating the insanity from the insane person. This dif­
ference indicates that there may be some truth in the notion 
that there are differential effects for different excuses 
dependent upon the degree of separation of the excuse from 
the actor. It certainly seems that the subjects considered 
insanity (strong or weak) to be a stable disposition that 
would lead the accused to commit the crime again, given the 
chance. Predictions that an actor will commit a similar act 
again in the future are indications that a disposition to 
commit similar acts has been inferred (Jones & Davis, 1968). 
It appears that the subjects perceived insanity to be an 
internal, stable disposition that will be effective in the 
determination of future actions.
In fact, lay opinion of insanity may well be the para­
digmatic case of a lasting, stable, internal disposition.
If this is so, it points up a difficulty with the conception 
of what a disposition actually is and how it is effective in 
producing behavior. Is it the insanity that produces the 
behavior, or is it the insane person? If the two are sepa­
rable, one could hold the insanity "responsible" for the 
behavior and excuse the person. This would hold true if a 
disposition is a cause of behavior, but would not be true if
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a disposition were considered to only "predispose" the per­
son to the action. If this latter interpretation of dispo­
sitions is correct, it is the person that performs the 
behavior, and therefore the person who is held responsible 
for the action.
Excuses exert their effect by providing another causal 
explanation for the outcome of the action. Therefore, if 
insanity causes behavior, it is an excuse for that behavior; 
if, however, insanity only "predisposes" the person to do 
the behavior, then insanity is not a direct cause of the 
behavior and therefore a poor excuse - if any at all. 
Finally, one may speculate from the results that if insanity 
is a disposition (which the large differences in prediction 
indicate) and insanity is not an excuse (which the lack of 
difference in the responsibility measures seems to indi­
cate), then dispositions do not cause behavior in at least 
the strict sense of the term "cause" required for something 
to be an excuse.
Both probability of conviction and severity of sanction 
respond to the difference in excuses dependent upon the 
source (internal, external) of the excuse. For both convic­
tion and sanction, the drugs condition was slightly higher 
than the insane condition and much higher than the coerced 
condition. This increase for conviction and sanction in the
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drugs condition may be a function of a confound of valence 
of the invoked excuse. Drug abuse is a negatively valenced 
action and its valence may well extend to the person abusing 
the drug. And, as Heider (1958) notes, a person who is neg­
atively valenced will receive higher levels of punishment 
than one who is neutral with respect to valence. If this 
valence effect could be partialled out, it would be inter­
esting to see whether or not a steady increase in both prob­
ability of conviction and severity of sanction would be 
established.
In the introduction to this study two different expla­
nations of the mediating factor in responsibility were 
reported - Harvey’s (1976) perceived freedom principle and 
Hamilton’s (1980) "could have done otherwise" principle. 
Are these two different views of the same process., competing 
explanations, or different explanations for different pro­
cesses?
The failure of the strength manipulation, which was 
specifically designed to test for these two principles, will 
make a concrete conclusion difficult to obtain, but there is 
something to be gained from correlational results. The cor­
relations of perceived freedom with moral and legal respon­
sibility, probability of conviction, and severity of sen­
tencing were all significant at .001, with legal
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responsibility having a significantly higher correlation 
with perceived freedom than with "could have done otherwise" 
and the difference between the correlations of moral respon­
sibility with the two measures being marginally significant. 
In addition to this, the intercorrelation between perceived 
freedom and "could have done otherwise" was not as high as 
expected, being only .38. This would lead one to suspect 
that if "could have done otherwise" responds to anything in 
the stimulus situation, it does so with a fair amount of 
independence from the fluctuation of perceived freedom. So, 
if indeed "could have done otherwise" is a factor in attrib­
uting responsibility etc., its effects may well differ from 
those of perceived freedom. Again, these conclusions are 
tentative at best, and a clear manipulation of the strength 
of an excuse will be needed to establish some connection.
It is interesting in the light of the big differences 
found for recommended sentencing, predicted future action, 
and probability of conviction, that there were no differ­
ences in amount of legal or moral responsibility ascribed to 
the accused. The reason behind this may also explain the 
failure of the strength manipulation. It is possible that 
the severity of the crime (mass murder is deplored by most 
in our society) tended to wash out any effects that would 
have otherwise been found. This particular type of crime
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was chosen in the first place because it seemed the only 
type of crime for which an excuse as desperate as insanity 
would be used. Because of the nature of the crime, subjects 
may well have been insensitive to a situation that would 
mitigate responsibility - but could have been receptive to 
mitigating probability of conviction or severity of punish­
ment. These latter two measures may be more "flexible" to 
mitigating circumstances than is responsibility. The reac­
tion to a crime of such gravity is such that very little can 
overcome the indignation of the observer and excuse the per­
son. In alleviating one problem, we may well have caused 
another. An approach that would eliminate this difficulty - 
and possibly take advantage of it at the same time - would 
be to manipulate the severity of the offense. A difference 
that is evident at a lower severity of offense may dissap- 
pear when a more severe crime is perpetrated. An excuse 
that will work when I have spilled coffee on your couch will 
not have the same effect if I have wrecked your car.
Another difficulty that was noted during the debriefing 
of the subjects was their disbelief in the truth of the 
accused's testimony. This was reflected in the odd pattern 
of responses to the question "How resonsible do you think 
Mike feels for shooting the people?" This was mostly a 
function of the medium used. When the subjects reported
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those cues to which they responded most, tonal, postural, 
and gestural cues were invariably reported as more important 
than verbal ones. These cues, when added to the subject's 
tendency to be skeptical in the first place, merely created 
error variance that had nothing to do with the theoretical 
variables being investigated. This particular study is an 
example of the attempt at ecological validity producing dif­
ficulty with the instantiation of the theoretical variable. 
A better instantiation (which could even save ecological 
validity) would be the use of newspaper articles to present 
the information about the actor.
Another question that needs answering is one raised by 
Hamilton (1980), "Are there two different processes - 
assigning responsibility and assigning causal status - or is 
one derived from the other?" It seems that the answer from 
this study would be yes; there are two processes and they 
are at least not identical. The complete lack of any corre­
lation between the prediction variable and the two responsi­
bility measures lends credence to this assertion. The two 
outcomes - assigned responsibility and prediction of future 
action - do not at all covary, and this suggests that dif­
ferent factors affect the different outcomes. Also the 
experimental evidence lends credence to this suggestion. 
There were large differences in the subject's predictions of
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future similar action by the actor, but no significant dif­
ferences in either perceived moral or perceived legal 
responsibility. Those factors that affected predictions by 
the subjects had no affect on the subject's ascription of 
responsibility to the actor. And if we assume that pre­
diction is a type of causal attribution, these two processes 
are at least differentially affected by certain types of 
evidence.
Finally, we should gain some perspective on the "funda­
mental attribution error" from the results of this experi­
ment. The lack of significant difference between the con­
trol group and the experimental group was in line with the 
predictions of Nisbett <5c Ross (1980) that subjects will pay 
more attention to the action of the actor and less attention 
to the situational factors (whence come excuses). There 
were, however, differences in the relative effectiveness of 
the different excuses, so it cannot be said that the sub­
jects entirely ignored the situational excusing factors. 
For a crime of this magnitude, they may well have considered 
the excusing situational factors less relevant, but one can­
not doubt that they were attended to. We may safely con­
clude that situational factors may be important, but their 
importance hinges on their salience, and, if they are 
excuses, their effectiveness depends on their ability to
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"distance" the actor from the action.
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Figure 1 
Excuse x intent interaction 
for Perceived Choice
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Figure 2
Excuse x strength x intent interaction 
for perceived personal sense of responsibility
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Figure 3
Excuse x Intention interaction for 
perceived personal sense of responsibility
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APPENDIX A
Coercion, Low Strength, Low intention 
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen­
tral State University. Mike was fired from his job, and two 
days later, in what some have described as "an attempt to 
retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom 
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into 
the crowds of students changing classes. He kept up a 
steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team 
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa­
tion. At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with 
the SWAT team. Twenty tense minutes passed while the police 
cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic­
tims. Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears. When a 
toll was taken of the damage, it was found that 3 had been 
fatally injured, another 5 were in serious condition at a 
local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer­
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur­
der and manslaughter. He was detained by the police and is
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now under security at the state prison. The filmclip that 
you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between 
Mike and his lawyer, John Gordon. They are preparing for 
Mike's first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of 
questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but 
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what 
happened and also review some of the questions you'll be 
asked. One of. the first things I'll ask you is to give a 
description about what happened. Tell me again what you'll 
say, as if you are talking to the judge.'
Johnson:
As I am sure you all know, on the day that the shootings 
occured, I was contacted by the 'People's Liberation Front' 
and told that if I did not conform exactly to their specifi­
cations they would have one of their members bomb my house. 
The man on the phone said that this action was forced upon 
them by the backward policies of the university. The school 
had cut off funding to the group and removed their status as 
a campus organization. They told me that I should climb 
onto the roof of classroom building (A) at twelve noon and 
shoot at the passing crowds. I thought it was a joke, until
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someone showed up at the house about 11 AM. When I opened 
the door, he forced his way into the house and told me that 
he had come to escort me to classroom building (A). He then 
pulled a pistol on me and forced me to get into his car. He 
drove me to the building, got a suitcase out of the trunk, 
and led me up to the roof. After giving me the suitcase, he 
told me that it contained a high power gun. He then left, 
locking the door to the roof behind him. It was obvious to 
me that I had no choice left but to do as he said.
Gordon:
Okay, that's good. Now for some of the questions that the 
prosecution is bound to ask.
Have you had any connection with the People's Liberation 
Front before?
Johnson:
NO!, of course not. I didn't even know that they were in 
existence until they started calling me.
Gordon:
Wait a minute,wait a minute. You are implying that they have 
called you several times. Do you want to make that public 
knowledge?
Johnson:
Well -- no, but they had called me several times before.
G:
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Well then, if you don't want them to know, you shouldn't 
give any hint that you've been contacted before. I think 
that you should place stress on the fact that the front's 
choice of you was arbitrary. Be sure you tell them that. A 
spokesman from the People's Liberation Front has already 
relased a press statement to that effect and you should be 
sure to not contradict it.
J:
Do you think I want to? I know that their choice of me was 
arbitrary. I didn't know they existed and don't know much 
more now - don't want to know anymore.
G:
Alight, what about the statements that you were 'retaliat­
ing at the university'? Are those true?
J:
Oh come on! Of course not. I wouldn't think of shooting all 
those people just to get back at the administration. If 
anything, I'd shoot an administrator.
G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I wouldn't do something 
like that.
G:
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Nope. Everyone doesn’t know. Besides, the prosecution isn't 
looking to portray you as a nice guy, they want a convic­
tion .
J:
for any reason and I can’t make jokes in court.
G:
That's right. It won't seem like a joke when it becomes tes­
timony. What about the possibility that you could have 
called the police to get you out of the situation.
J:
Well I sure couldn't call the cops when the man had a pistol 
to by back! Besides, I thought it was a joke until he 
showed up.
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have 
avoided that.
J:
How? And have my house blown to bits? These guys were seri­
ous !
G:
Surely you value other people's lives more than you do your 
house?
J:
so I've never thought of shooting people
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Yeah, sure I do, but I was under pressure then. I had just 
spent fourty five minutes with a gun pointed at me. I 
didn't have time to think.
G:
Okay, just make sure the court realizes the extent of the 
pressure that you were under. (looks at watch) Its time. 
All you need to do is to be calm and answer the questions as 
honestly as possible. If someone asks a dangerous question, 
I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Coercion, Low Strength, High Intention 
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen­
tral State University. Mike was fired from his job, and two 
days later, in what some have described as "an attempt to 
retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom 
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into 
the crowds of students changing classes. He kept up a 
steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team 
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa­
tion. At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with 
the SWAT team. Twenty tense minutes passed while the police 
cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic­
tims. Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears. When a 
toll was taken of the damage, it was found that 3 had been 
fatally injured, another 5 were in serious condition at a 
local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer­
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur­
der and manslaughter. He was detained by the police and is 
now under security at the state prison. The filmclip that 
you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between 
Mike and his lawyer, John Gordon. They are preparing for a
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Mike’s first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of 
questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but 
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what 
happened and also review some of the questions you’ll be 
asked. One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a 
description about what happened. Tell me again what you’ll 
say, as if you are talking to the judge.
Johnson:
As I am sure you all know, on the day that the shootings 
occured, I was contacted by the People's Liberation Front 
and told that if I did not conform exactly to their specifi­
cations they would have one of their members bomb my house. 
The man on the phone said that this action was forced upon 
them by the backward policies of the university. The school 
had cut off funding to the group and removed their status as 
a campus organization. They told me that I should climb 
onto the roof of classroom building (A) at twelve noon and 
shoot at the passing crowds. I thought it was a joke, until 
someone showed up at the house about 11 AM. When I opened 
the door, he forced his way into the house and told me that 
he had come to escort me to classroom building (A). He then
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pulled a pistol on me and forced me to get into his car. He 
drove me to the building, got a suitcase out of the trunk, 
and led me up to the roof. After giving me the suitcase, he 
told me that it contained a high power gun. He then left, 
locking the door to the roof behind him. It was obvious to 
me that I had no choice left but to do as he said.
Gordon:
Okay, that's good. Now for some of the questions that the 
prosecution is bound to ask.
Have you had any connection with the People's Liberation 
Front before?
Johnson:
NO!, of course not. I didn't even know that they were in 
existence until they started calling me.
Gordon:
Wait a minute,wait a.minute. You are implying that they have 
called you several times. Do you want to make that public 
knowledge?
Johnson:
Well -- no, but they had called me several times before.
G:
Well then, if you don't want them to know, you shouldn't 
give any hint that you’ve been contacted before. I think 
that you should place stress on the fact that the front's
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choice of you was arbitrary. Be sure you tell them that. A 
spokesman from the People's Liberation Front has already 
relased a press statement to that effect and you should be 
sure to not contradict it.
J:
Do you think I want to? I know that their choice of me was 
arbitrary. I used to not know they existed and don't know 
much more now - don't want to know anymore.
G:
Alright, what about the statements that you were 'retaliat­
ing at the university'? Are those true?
J:
Well, I wish I had thought of doing something like that. 
The bastards in the administration need something to shake 
them up.
G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I was fired without reason. 
And I'm not sure people would believe me if I said I wanted 
to do it. I had thought about it - really. Maybe now some­
body will wonder why I was fired.
G:
Nope. Noone wants to know. Besides, the prosecution isn't
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looking to portray you as a victim of the school, they would 
rather show you as an accomplice of a terrorist group.
J:
Alright, alight, so I’ve never thought of shooting people 
for any reason and I can’t make jokes to the court.
G:
That’s right. It won't seem like a joke when it becomes tes­
timony. What about the possibility that you could have 
called the police to get you out of the situation.
J:
Well I sure couldn’t call the cops when the man had a pistol 
to by back! Besides, I thought it was a joke until he 
showed up.
G:
But you still didn’t have to start shooting, you could have 
avoided that.
J:
How? And have my house blown to bits? These guys were seri­
ous !
G:
Surely you value other people’s lives more than you do your 
house?
J:
Yeah, sure I do, but I was under pressure then. I had just
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spent fourty five minutes with a gun pointed at me. I 
didn't have time to think.
G:
Okay, just make sure the court realizes the extent of the 
pressure that you were under. (looks at watch) Its time. 
All you need to do is be calm and answer the questions as 
honestly as possible. If someone asks a dangerous question, 
I'11 catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Coercion, High Strength, Low Intention 
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen­
tral State University. Mike was fired from his job, and two 
days later, in what some have described as "an attempt to 
retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom 
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into 
the crowds of students changing classes. He kept up a 
steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team 
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa­
tion. At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with 
the SWAT team. Twenty tense minutes passed while the police 
cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic­
tims. Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears. When a 
toll was taken of the damage, it was found that 3 had been 
fatally injured, another 5 were in serious condition at a 
local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer­
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur­
der and manslaughter. He was detained by the police and is 
now under security at the state prison. The filmclip that 
you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between 
Mike and his lawyer, John Gordon. They are preparing for
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Mike’s first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of 
questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but 
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what 
happened and also review some of the questions you'll be 
asked. One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a 
description about what happened. Tell me again what you'll 
say, as if you are talking to the judge.
Johnson:
As I am sure you all know, on the day that the shootings 
occured, I was contacted by the People's Liberation Eront 
and told that Melissa, my wife, had been kidnapped. He said 
that I was to do exactly as they said or she would be 
killed. At first I didn't believe them. I thought that it 
was a sick joke by someone. Then Melissa spoke with me on 
the phone and assured me they were serious. I was sure it 
was her because she told me some things that only we two are 
supposed to know. Then the man grabbed the phone from her 
and told me that if I ever wanted to see her again, I would 
not call the police and do exactly as he said. He told me 
to wait for someone to show up at my house. That person 
would take me to the roof of classroom building(A) and sup-
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ply me with a gun. I was to use the gun to fire on the 
crowds below. The man on the phone said that this action 
was forced upon them by the backward policies of the univer­
sity. The school had cut off funding to the group and 
removed their status as a campus organization. There was 
nothing I could do but wait. About 11 AM someone drove up 
in the driveway and walked to the door. When I opened the 
door, he forced his way into the house and told me that he 
had come to escort me to classroom building (A). He then 
pulled a pistol on me and forced me to get into his car. He 
drove me to the building, got a suitcase out of the trunk, 
and led me up to the roof. After giving me the suitcase, he 
told me that it contained a high power gun. He then left, 
locking the door to the roof behind him. It was obvious to 
me that if I wanted to see my wife again, I had no choice 
left but to do as he said.
Gordon:
Okay, that's good. Now for some of the questions that the 
prosecution is bound to ask.
Have you had any connection with the People's Liberation 
Front before?
Johnson:
NO!, of course not. I didn't even know that they were in 
existence until they started calling me.
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Gordon:
Wait a minute,wait a minute. You are implying that they have 
called you several times. Do you want to make that public 
knowledge?
Johnson:
Well -- no, but they had called me several times before.
G:
Well then, if you don’t want them to know, you shouldn't 
give any hint that you've been contacted before. I think 
that you should place stress on the fact that the front's 
choice of you was arbitrary. Be sure you tell them that. A 
spokesman from the People's Liberation Front has already 
relased a press statement to that effect and you should be 
sure to not contradict it.
J:
Do you think I want to? I know that their choice of me was 
arbitrary. I used to not know they existed and don't know 
much more now - don't want to know anymore.
G:
Alright, what about the statements that you were 'retaliat­
ing at the university'? Are those true?
J:
Oh come on! Of course not. I wouldn't think of shooting all 
those people just to get back at the administration. If
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anything, I'd shoot an administrator.
G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I wouldn't do something 
like that.
G:
Nope. Everyone doesn't know. Besides, the prosecution isn't 
looking to portray you as a nice guy, they want a convic­
tion .
J:
for any reason and I can't make jokes to the court.
G:
That’s right. It won't seem like a joke when it becomes tes­
timony. What about the possibility that you could have 
called the police to get you out of the situation.
J:
Well I sure couldn't call the cops when the man had a pistol 
to by back!
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have 
avoided that.
J:
so I've never thought of shooting people
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How? And have my my wife killed? These guys were serious!
G:
That's a hard choice, but couldn't you have tried to miss 
everyone?
J:
Yeah, sure I could have, but the guy told me I was supposed 
to hit people -- they wouldn't have given me my wife back
if I hadn't. Besides, I had just spent 45 minutes with a
gun at my back, was under too much pressure to spend a lot 
of time thinking. And I'm not a good shot - I had to hit
someone and I couldn't control where I hit them.
G:
Okay, just make sure the court realizes the extent of the 
pressure that you were under. (looks at watch) Its time. 
All you need to do is be calm and answer the questions as 
honestly as possible. If someone asks a dangerous question 
I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Coercion, High Strength, High Intention 
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen­
tral State University. Mike was fired from his job, and two 
days later, in what some have described as "an attempt to 
retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom 
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into 
the crowds of students changing classes. He kept up a 
steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team 
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa­
tion. At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with 
the SWAT team. Twenty tense minutes passed while the police 
cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic­
tims. Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears. When a 
toll was taken of the damage, it was found that 3 had been 
fatally injured, another 5 were in serious condition at a 
local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer­
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur­
der and manslaughter. He was detained by the police and is 
now under security at the state prison. The filmclip that 
you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between 
Mike and his lawyer, John Gordon. They are preparing for
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Mike’s first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of 
questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but 
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what 
happened and also review some of the questions you’ll be 
asked. One of the first things I’ll ask you is to give a 
description about what happened. Tell me again what you'll 
say, as if you are talking to the judge.
Johnson:
As I am sure you all know, on the day that the shootings 
occured, I was contacted by the People’s Liberation Front 
and told that Melissa, my wife, had been kidnapped. He said 
that I was to do exactly as they said or she would be 
killed. At first I didn't believe them. I thought that it 
was a sick joke by someone. Then Melissa spoke with me on 
the phone and assured me they were serious. I was sure it 
was her because she told me some things that only we two are 
supposed to know. Then the man grabbed the phone from her 
and told me that if I ever wanted to see her again, I would 
not call the police and do exactly as he said. He told me 
to wait for someone to show up at my house. That person 
would take me to the roof of classroom building(A) and sup-
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ply me with a gun. I was to use the gun to fire on the 
crowds below. The man on the phone said that this action 
was forced upon them by the backward policies of the univer­
sity. The school had cut off funding to the group and 
removed their status as a campus organization. There was 
nothing I could do but wait. About 11 AM someone drove up 
in the driveway and walked to the door. When I opened the 
door, he forced his way into the house and told me that he 
had come to escort me to classroom building (A). He then 
pulled a pistol on me and forced me to get into his car. He 
drove me to the building, got a suitcase out of the trunk, 
and led me up to the roof. After giving me the suitcase, he 
told me that it contained a high power gun. He then left, 
locking the door to the roof behind him. It was obvious to 
me that if I wanted to see my wife again, I had no choice 
left but to do as he said.
Gordon:
Okay, that's good. Now for some of the questions that the 
prosecution is bound to ask.
Have you had any connection with the People's Liberation 
Front before?
Johnson:
NO!, of course not. I didn't even know that they were in 
existence until they started calling me.
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Gordon:
Wait a minute,wait a minute. You are implying that they have 
called you several times. Do you want to make that public 
knowledge?
Johnson:
Well -- no, but they had called me several times before.
G:
Well then, if you don't want them to know, you shouldn't 
give any hint that you've been contacted before. I think 
that you should place stress on the fact that the front's 
choice of you was arbitrary. Be sure you tell them that. A 
spokesman from the Poeple's Liberation Front has already 
relased a press statement to that effect and you should be 
sure to not contradict it.
J:
Do you think I want to? I know that their choice of me was 
arbitrary. I used to not know they existed and don't know 
much more now - don't want to know anymore.
G:
Alright, what about the statements that you were 'retaliat­
ing at the university'? Are those true?
J:
Well, I wish I had thought of doing something like that. 
The bastards in the administration need something to shake
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them up.
G: (quickly)
You don’t want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I was fired without reason. 
And I'm not sure people would believe me if I said I wanted 
to do it. I had thought of it - really. Maybe now somebody 
will wonder why I was fired.
G:
Nope. Noone wants to know. Besides, the prosecution isn't 
looking to portray you as a victim of the school, they would 
rather show you as an accomplice of a terrorist group.
J:
for any reason and I can’t make jokes to the court.
G:
That’s right. It won’t seem like a joke when it becomes tes­
timony. What about the possibility that you could have 
called the police to get you out of the situation.
J:
Well I sure couldn't call the cops when the man had a pistol 
to by back!
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have
so I’ve never thought of shooting people
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avoided that.
J:
How? And have my my wife killed? These guys were serious!
G:
That’s a hard choice, but couldn’t you have tried to miss 
everyone?
J:
Yeah, sure I could have, but the guy told me I was supposed 
to hit people -- they wouldn't have given me my wife back
if I hadn’t. Besides, I had just spent 45 minutes with a
gun at my back, was under too much pressure to spend a lot 
of time thinking. And I'm not a good shot - I had to hit
someone and I couldn’t control where I hit them.
G:
Okay, just make sure the court realizes the extent of the 
pressure that you were under. (looks at watch) Its time. 
All you need to do is be calm and answer the questions as 
honestly as possible. If someone asks a dangerous question, 
I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Insanity, Low strength, High Intention 
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen­
tral State University. Mike was fired from his job, and two 
days later, in what some have described as "an attempt to 
retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom 
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into 
the crowds of students changing classes. He kept up a 
steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team 
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa­
tion. At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with 
the SWAT team. Twenty tense minutes passed while the police 
cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic­
tims. Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears. When a 
toll was taken of the damage, it was found that 3 had been 
fatally injured, another 5 were in serious condition at a 
local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer­
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur­
der and manslaughter. He was detained by the police and is 
now under security at the state prison. The filmclip that 
you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between 
Mike and his lawyer, John Gordon. They are preparing for
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Mike's first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of 
questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but 
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what 
happened and also review some of the questions you'll be 
asked. One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a 
description about what happened. Tell me again what you'll 
say, as if you are talking to the judge.
Johnson:
As I am sure you all know, just a few days before the shoot­
ings occured, I was fired from my job. My entire career was 
destroyed by this unjust action, and I was thrown into a 
deep depression. I did nothing for an entire day and would 
neither eat nor sleep. My wife could do nothing with me and 
told me I should go see a psychiatrist. That was on the 
morning of the shootings. It appeared to me as though my 
entire life had gone down the drain. I guess it was about 
11 AM that I finally broke. I don't remember much except 
going to the gun cabinet. I had at that time intended to 
commit suicide. I must have been at that moment that the 
break occured. I am told that I drove my car to classroom 
building (A) and, hiding the gun, mounted the stairs to the
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roof. It was when I heard the man from the police talking 
to me that I realized what I was doing and threw down my 
gun. It took me several minutes after that to see that the 
door to the roof was locked. I then went over to the door 
and let the police in. As you can see from this description 
of the facts, I was not aware of the actions I performed. 
Gordon:
Okay, that's good. Now for some of the questions that the
\
prosecution is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were 'retaliating at the 
university1? Are those true?
J:
Well, I wish I had thought of doing something like that. 
The bastards in the administration need something to shake 
them up.
G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I was fired without reason. 
And I’m not sure people would believe me if I said I wanted 
to do it. I had thought about it - really. Maybe now some­
body will wonder why I was fired.
G:
Nope. Noone wants to know. Besides, the prosecution isn't
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looking to portray you as a victim of the school, they would 
rather show you as a scheming psychopath who likes to shoot 
people.
J:
for any reason and I can’t joke with the press.
G:
That’s right. It won't seem like a joke when it becomes tes­
timony. What about the possibility that you could have 
called a doctor or a psychiatrist to get you out of the 
situation?
J:
Well I sure couldn't call a doctor before I knew it would 
happen. And while it was happening I didn't know what I was 
doing.
G:
But you still didn’t have to start shooting, you could have 
avoided that.
J:
How? I told you that I wasn’t in control!
G:
You know that, but you have to convince these people. 
Surely you value other people's lives enough that you could 
realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
So I've never thought of shooting people
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J:
Yeah, sure I value people's lives. But I was under so much 
pressure about my financial situation that I couldn't think. 
And when it all finally broke, I didn't have time to think. 
G:
Okay, just make sure the court realizes the extent of the 
pressure that you were under. (looks at watch) Its time. 
All you need to do is to be calm and answer the questions as 
honestly as possible. If someone asks a dangerous question, 
I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Insanity; Low Strength, Low Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen­
tral State University. Mike was fired from his job, and two 
days later, in what some have described as "an attempt to 
retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom 
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into 
the crowds of students changing classes. He kept up a 
steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team 
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa­
tion. At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with 
the SWAT team. Twenty tense minutes passed while the police 
cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic­
tims. Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears. When a 
toll was taken of the damage, it was found that 3 had been 
fatally injured, another 5 were in serious condition at a 
local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer­
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur­
der and manslaughter. He was detained by the police and is 
now under security at the state prison. The filmclip that 
you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between 
Mike and his lawyer, John Gordon. They are preparing for
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Mike’s first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of 
questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but 
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what 
happened and also review some of the questions you’ll be 
asked. One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a 
description about what happened. Tell me again what you'll 
say, as if you are talking to the judge.
Johnson:
As I am sure you all well know, just a few days before the 
shootings occured, I was fired from my job. My entire 
career was destroyed by this unjust action, and I was thrown 
into a deep depression. I did nothing for an entire day and 
would neither eat nor sleep. My wife could do nothing with 
me and told me I should go see a psychiatrist. That was on 
the morning of the shootings. It appeared to me as though 
my entire life had gone down the drain. I guess it was 
about 11 AM that I finally broke. I don't remember much 
except going to the gun cabinet. I had at that time
intended to commit suicide. I must have been at that moment 
that the break occured. I am told that I drove my car to 
classroom building (A) and, hiding the gun, mounted the
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stairs to the roof. It was when I heard the man from the 
police talking to me that I realized what I was doing and 
threw down my gun. It took me several minutes after that to 
see that the door to the roof was locked. I then went over 
to the door and let the police in. As you can see from this 
description of the facts, I was not aware of the actions I 
performed.
Gordon:
Okay, that's good. Now for some of the questions that the 
press is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were 'retaliating at the 
university'? Are those true?
J:
Oh come on! Of course not. I wouldn't think of shooting all 
those people just to get back at the administration. If 
anything, I’d shoot an administrator.
G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I wouldn't do something 
like that.
G:
Nope. Everyone doesn't know. Besides, the prosecution isn't 
looking to portray you as a nice guy, they want a convic-
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tion.
J:
Alight, alright, I’ve never thought of shooting people for 
any reason and that’s true! My friends would think it was a 
joke if I told them I wanted to shoot anyone.
G:
That may be right. It won't seem like a joke when it becomes 
testimony What about the possibility that you could have 
called a doctor or a psychiatrist to get you out of the 
situation?
J:
Well I sure couldn't call a doctor before I knew it would 
happen. And while it was happening I didn't know what I was 
doing.
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have 
avoided that.
J:
How? I told you that I wasn't in control!
G:
You know that, but you have to convince these people. 
Surely you value other people's lives enough that you could 
realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
J:
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Yeah, sure I value people's lives. But I was under so much 
pressure about my financial situation that I couldn't think 
And when it all finally broke, I didn't have time to think. 
G:
Okay, just make sure the court realizes the extent of the 
pressure that you were under. (looks at watch) Its time. 
All you need to do is be calm and answer the questions as 
honestly as possible. If someone asks a dangerous question, 
I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Insanity, High Strength, Low Intent
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen­
tral State University. Mike was fired from his job, and two 
days later, in what some have described as "an attempt to 
retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom 
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into 
the crowds of students changing classes. He kept up a 
steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team 
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa­
tion. At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with 
the SWAT team. Twenty tense minutes passed while the police 
cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic­
tims. Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears. When a 
toll was taken of the damage, it was found that 3 had been 
fatally injured, another 5 were in serious condition at a 
local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer­
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur­
der and manslaughter. He was detained by the police and is 
now under security at the state prison. The filmclip that 
you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between 
Mike and his lawyer, John Gordon. They are preparing for
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Mike's first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of 
questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but 
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what 
happened and also review some of the questions you' 11 be 
asked. One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a 
description about what happened. Tell me again what you'll 
say, as if you are talking to the judge.
Johnson:
As I am sure you all know, just a few days before the shoot­
ings occured, I was fired from my job. My entire career was 
destroyed by this unjust action, and I was thrown into a 
deep depression. I did nothing for an entire day and would 
neither eat nor sleep. My wife could do nothing with me and 
told me I should go see a psychiatrist. That was on the 
morning of the shootings. It appeared to me as though my 
entire life had gone down the drain. I guess it was about 
11 AM that I finally broke. I don't remember much except 
going to the gun cabinet. I had at that time intended to 
commit suicide. I must have been at that moment that the 
break occured. I am told that I drove my car to classroom 
building (A) and, hiding the gun, mounted the stairs to the
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roof. It was when I heard the man from the police talking 
to me that I realized what I was doing and threw down my 
gun. It took me several minutes after that to see that the 
door to the roof was locked. I then went over to the door 
and let the police in.
Gordon:
Okay, that’s good. Now for some of the questions that the 
press is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were 'retaliating at the 
university1? Are those true?
J:
Why, would I do that? Come on John. I wouldn’t think of
shooting all those people. all those kids-----  some of
them-no, noone. An administrator?
G: (quickly)
You don’t want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I wouldn't do something 
like that.
G:
Nope. Everyone doesn't know. Besides, the prosecution isn’t 
looking to portray you as a nice guy, they want a convic­
tion .
J:
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Alright. But I’m making a joke - to poke fun - a pun - but 
its not.
G:
It won’t seem like a joke when it becomes testimony. What 
about the possibility that you could have called a doctor or 
a psychiatrist to get you out of the situation?
J:
Well sure _I couldn't call a doctor before I knew it would 
happen. And while I was happening I didn't know what I was 
happening.
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have 
avoided that.
J:
How? I told you that I was happening! My me was doing it.
She was --
G: (breaking in)
You know that, but you have to convince these people. 
Surely you value other people's lives enough that you could 
realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
J:
Yeah, sure I value people's lives. But I was under so much 
pressure about my me - my my - my, my, my- I couldn't think. 
And when it all finally broke, I didn't -- I don't-- have
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time to think.
G:
Okay, just make sure the court realizes the extent of the 
pressure that you were under. (looks at watch) Its time. 
All you need to do is be calm and answer the questions as 
honestly as possible. If someone asks a dangerous question, 
I’ll before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Insanity, High Strength, High Intention 
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen­
tral State University. Mike was fired from his job, and two 
days later, in what some have described as "an attempt to 
retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom 
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into 
the crowds of students changing classes. He kept up a 
steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team 
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa­
tion. At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with 
the SWAT team. Twenty tense minutes passed while the police 
cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic­
tims. Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears. When a 
toll was taken of the damage, it was found that 3 had been 
fatally injured, another 5 were in serious condition at a 
local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer­
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur­
der and manslaughter. He was detained by the police and is 
now under security at the state prison. The filmclip that 
you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between 
Mike and his lawyer, John Gordon. They are preparing for
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Mike’s first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of 
questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but 
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what 
happened and also review some of the questions you'll be 
asked. One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a 
description about what happened. Tell me again what you’ll 
say, as if you are talking to the judge.
Johnson:
As I am sure you all well know, just a few days before the 
shootings occured, I was fired from my job. My entire 
career was destroyed by this unjust action, and I was thrown 
into a deep depression. I did nothing for an entire day and 
would neither eat nor sleep. My wife could do nothing with 
me and told me I should go see a psychiatrist. That was on 
the morning of the shootings. It appeared to me as though 
my entire life had gone down the drain. I guess it was 
about 11 AM that I finally broke. I don't remember much 
except going to the gun cabinet. I had at that time
intended to commit suicide. I must have been at that moment 
that the break occured. I am told that I drove my car to 
classroom building (A) and, hiding the gun, mounted the
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stairs to the roof. It was when I heard the man from the 
police talking to me that I realized what I was doing and 
threw down my gun. It took me several minutes after that to 
see that the door to the roof was locked. I then went over 
to the door and let the police in.
Gordon:
Okay, that’s good. Now for some of the questions that the 
prosecution is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were ’retaliating at the 
university'? Are those true?
J:
(this should be one of the few lucid statements)
Well, I wish I had thought of doing something like that. 
The bastards in the administration need something to shake 
them up.
G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J: (psychosis should reassert itself here)
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I was fired without reason. 
And I'm not sure people would believe me if I said I wanted 
to do it. I had thought about it - really I had. Maybe now 
somebody will wonder why I was fired - I'm tired- uh-wired. 
G:
No, no, no. The prosecution isn’t looking to portray you as
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a victim of the school, they would rather show you as a 
florid psychotic who wants to kill people.
J:
its not.
G:
It won't seem like a joke when it becomes testimony. What 
about the possibility that you could have called a doctor or 
a psychiatrist to get you out of the situation?
J:
Well sure I_ couldn't call a doctor before I knew it would 
happen. And while I was happening I didn't know what I was 
happening.
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have 
avoided that.
J:
How? I told you that I was happening! My me was doing it.
She was --
G: (breaking in)
You know that, but you have to convince these people. 
Surely you value other people's lives enough that you could 
realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
J:
But I 1m making a j oke - to poke fun - a pun - but
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Yeah, sure I value people's lives. But I was under so much 
pressure about my me - my my - my, my, my- I couldn't think. 
And when it all finally broke, I didn’t -- I don't-- have 
time to think.
G:
Okay, just make sure the court realizes the extent of the 
pressure that you are under. (looks at watch) Its time. All 
you need to do is be calm and answer the questions as hon­
estly as possible. If someone asks a dangerous question, 
I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Drugs, Low Strength, High Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen­
tral State University. Mike was fired from his job, and two 
days later, in what some have described as "an attempt to 
retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom 
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into 
the crowds of students changing classes. He kept up a 
steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team 
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa­
tion. At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with 
the SWAT team. Twenty tense minutes passed while the police 
cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic­
tims. Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears. When a 
toll was taken of the damage, it was found that 3 had been 
fatally injured, another 5 were in serious condition at a 
local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer­
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur­
der and manslaughter. He was detained by the police and is 
now under security at the state prison. The filmclip that 
you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between 
Mike and his lawyer, John Gordon. They are preparing for
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Mike's first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of 
questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but 
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what 
happened and also review some of the questions you' 11 be 
asked. One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a 
description about what happened. Tell me again what you'll 
say, as if you are talking to the judge.
JOHN:
As I am sure you all know, just a few days before the shoot­
ings occured, I was fired from my job. My entire career was 
destroyed by this unjust action, and I was thrown into a
deep depression. I did nothing for an entire day and
wouldn't even eat. That was the day before the shootings. 
It appeared to me as though my entire life had gone down the
drain. I decided to get stoned so I could forget about it
for a while. The drugs only exaggerated my depression. I 
felt worse than I had before and decided that my life wasn't 
worth living. I remember going to the gun cabinet. I had 
at that time intended to commit suicide. It must have been 
then that the I decided to act. I drove my car to classroom 
building (A) and, hiding the gun, mounted the stairs to the
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roof. It was when I heard the man from the police talking 
to me that I realized what I was doing and threw down my 
gun. It took me several minutes after that to see that the 
door to the roof was locked. I then went over to the door 
and let the police in. As you can see from this description 
of the facts, I was not fully aware of the actions I per­
formed .
Gordon:
Okay, that's good. Now for some of the questions that the 
prosecution is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were 'retaliating at the 
university'? Are those true?
J:
Well, I wish I had thought of doing something like that. 
The bastards in the administration need something to shake 
them up.
G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I was fired without reason. 
And I'm not sure people would believe me if I said I wanted 
to do it. I had thought about it - really. Maybe now some­
body will wonder why I was fired.
G:
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Nope. Noone wants to know. Besides, the prosecution isn't 
looking to portray you as a victim of the school, they would 
rather show you as a drug addict that likes to shoot people. 
J:
Alright, alright, so I've never thought of shooting people 
for any reason.. My friends would think it was a joke if I 
told them I wanted to shoot anyone.
G:
That may be right. It won't seem like a joke when it becomes 
testimony. What about the possibility that you could have 
called a friend or someone to get you out of the situation? 
J:
Well I sure couldn't call anyone before I knew it would hap­
pen. And while it was happening I didn't know what I was 
doing.
G:
But you still didn't have.to start shooting, you could have 
avoided that.
J:
How? I told you that I was stoned!
G:
You know that, but you have to convince these people. 
Surely you value other people,' s lives enough that you could 
realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
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J:
Yeah, sure I value people's lives. But I was under so much 
pressure about my financial situation that I couldn't think. 
And when it all finally broke, I didn't have time to think. 
G:
Okay, just make sure the court realizes the extent of the 
pressure that you were under. (looks at watch) Its time. 
All you need to do is be calm and answer the questions as 
honestly as possible. If someone asks a dangerous question, 
I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Drugs, Low Strength, Low Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen­
tral State University. Mike was fired from his job, and two 
days later, in what some have described as "an attempt to 
retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom 
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into 
the crowds of students changing classes. He kept up a 
steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team 
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa­
tion. At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with 
the SWAT team. Twenty tense minutes passed while the police 
cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic­
tims. Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears. When a 
toll was taken of the damage, it was found that 3 had been 
fatally injured, another 5 were in serious condition at a 
local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer­
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur­
der and manslaughter. He was detained by the police and is 
now under security at the state prison. The filmclip that 
you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between 
Mike and his lawyer, John Gordon. They are preparing for
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Mike's first court, appearance by reviewing the kinds of 
questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but 
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what 
happened and also review some of the questions you'll be 
asked. One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a 
description about what happened. Tell me again what you'll 
say, as if you are talking to the judge.
JOHN:
As I am sure you all well know, just a few days before the 
shootings occured, I was fired from my job. My entire 
career was destroyed by this unjust action, and I was thrown 
into a deep depression. I did nothing for an entire day and 
wouldn't even eat. That was the day before the shootings. 
It appeared to me as though my entire life had gone down the 
drain. I decide to get stoned so I could forget about it 
for a while. The drugs only exaggerated my depression. I 
felt worse than I had before and decided that my life wasn't 
worth living. I remember going to the gun cabinet. I had 
at that time intended to commit suicide. It must have been 
then that I decided to act. I drove my car to classroom 
building (A) and, hiding the gun, mounted the stairs to the
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roof. It was when I heard the man from the police talking 
to me that I realized what I was doing and threw down my 
gun. It took me several minutes after that to see that the 
door to the roof was locked. I then went over to the door 
and let the police in. As you can see from this description 
of the facts, I was not aware of the actions I performed and 
should not be considered liable for those actions.
Gordon:
Okay, that's good. Now for some of the questions that the 
prosecution is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were 'retaliating at the 
university'? Are those true?
J:
Oh come on! Of course not. I wouldn't think of shooting all 
those people just to get back at the administration. If 
anything, I'd shoot an administrator.
G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I wouldn't do something 
like that.
G:
Nope. Everyone doesn't know. Besides, the prosecution isn't 
looking to portray you as a nice guy, they want a convic-
Excuses and Responsibility
113
tion.
J:
Alright, alight, I've never thought of shooting people for 
any reason - and that's true. My friends would think it was 
a joke if I told them I wanted to shoot anyone.
G:
That may be right. It won't seem like a joke when it becomes 
testimony. What about the possibility that you could have 
called a friend or someone to get you out of the situation? 
J:
Well I sure couldn't call anyone before I knew it would hap­
pen. And while it was happening I didn't know what I was 
doing.
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have 
avoided that.
J:
How? I told you that I was stoned!
G:
You know that, but you have to convince these people. 
Surely you value other people's lives enough that you could 
realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
J:
Yeah, sure I value people's lives. But I was under so much
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pressure about my financial situation that I couldn't think 
And when it all finally broke, I didn't have time to think. 
G:
Okay, just make sure the court realizes the extent of the 
pressure that you were under. (looks at watch) Its time. 
All you have to do is be calm and answer the questions as 
honestly as possible. If someone asks a dongerous ques­
tion, I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Drugs, High Strength, Low Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen­
tral State University. Mike was fired from his job, and two 
days later, in what some have described as "an attempt to 
retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom 
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into 
the crowds of students changing classes. He kept up a 
steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team 
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa­
tion. At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with 
the SWAT team. Twenty tense minutes passed while the police 
cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic­
tims. Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears. When a 
toll was taken of the damage, it was found that 3 had been 
fatally injured, another 5 were in serious condition at a 
local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer­
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur­
der and manslaughter. He was detained by the police and is 
now under security at the state prison. The filmclip that 
you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between 
Mike and his lawyer, John Gordon. They are preparing for
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Mike's first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of 
questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but 
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what 
happened and also review some of the questions you'll be 
asked. One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a 
description about what happened. Tell me again what you'll 
say, as if you are talking to the judge.
JOHN:
As I am sure you all know, just a few days before the shoot­
ings occured, I was fired from my job. My entire career was 
destroyed by this unjust action, and I was thrown into a 
deep depression. I did nothing for an entire day and 
wouldn't even eat. That was the day before the shootings. 
It appeared to me as though my entire life had gone down the 
drain. I decided to get stoned so I could forget about it 
for a while. The drugs only exaggerated my depression. 
Once I started I couldn't stop and I have no idea of the 
amount or kind of drugs I took. I felt worse than I had 
before and decided that my life wasn't worth living. I 
don't remember anything after going to the gun cabinet. I 
had at that time intended to commit suicide. It must have
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been in that stupor that the break occured. I am told that 
I drove my car to classroom building (A) and, hiding the 
gun, mounted the stairs to the roof. It was when I heard 
the man from the police talking to me that I realized what I 
was doing and threw down my gun. It took me several minutes 
after that to see that the door to the roof was locked. I 
then went over to the door and let the police in. As you 
can see from this description of the facts, I was not aware 
of the actions I performed and should not be considered lia­
ble for those actions.
Gordon:
Okay, that’s good. Now for some of the questions that the 
prosecution is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were 'retaliating at the 
university'? Are those true?
J:
Oh come on! Of course not. I wouldn't think of shooting all 
those people just to get back at the administration. If 
anything, I'd shoot an administrator.
G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I wouldn't do something 
like that.
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G:
Nope. Everyone doesn't know. Besides, the prosecution isn't 
looking to portray you as a nice guy, they want a convic­
tion .
J:
any reason - and that's true. My friends would think it was 
a joke if I told them I wanted to shoot anyone.
G:
That may be right. It won't seem like a joke when it becomes 
testimony. What about the possibility that you could have 
called a friend or someone to get you out of the situation? 
Jr-
Well I sure couldn't call anyone before I knew it would hap­
pen. And while it was happening I didn't know what I was 
doing.
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have 
avoided that.
J:
How? I told you that I wasn't in control!
G:
You know that, but you have to convince these people. 
Surely you value other people's lives enough that you could
/
I've never thought of shooting people for
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realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
J:
Yeah, sure I value people’s lives. But I was under so much 
pressure about my financial situation that I couldn’t think 
And with all those drugs in me I didn't have time to think. 
G:
Okay, just make sure the court realizes the extent of the 
pressure that you were under. (looks at watch) Its time. 
All you have to do is be calm and answer the questions as 
honestly as possible. If anyone asks a dangerous question, 
I'11 catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Drugs, High Strength, High Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen­
tral State University. Mike was fired from his job, and two 
days later, in what some have described as "an attempt to 
retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom 
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into 
the crowds of students changing classes. He kept up a 
steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team 
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa­
tion. At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with 
the SWAT team. Twenty tense minutes passed while the police 
cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic­
tims. Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears. When a 
toll was taken of the damage, it was found that 3 had been 
fatally injured, another 5 were in serious condition at a 
local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer­
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur­
der and manslaughter. He was detained by the police and is 
now under security at the state prison. The filmclip that 
you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between 
Mike and his lawyer, John Gordon. They are preparing for
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Mike’s first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of 
questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but 
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what 
happened and also review some of the questions you’ll be 
asked. One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a 
description about what happened. Tell me again what you’ll 
say, as if you are talking to the judge.
JOHN:
As I am sure you all know, just a few days before the shoot­
ings occured, I was fired from my job. My entire career was 
destroyed by this unjust action, and I was thrown into a
deep depression. I did nothing for an entire day and
wouldn’t even eat. That was the day before the shootings. 
It appeared to me as though my entire life had gone down the
drain. I decided to get stoned so I could forget about it
for a while. The drugs only exaggerated my depression. 
Once I started I couldn't stop and I have no idea of the 
amount or kind of drugs I took. I felt worse than I had 
before and decided that my life wasn't worth living. I 
don't remember anything after going to the gun cabinet. I 
had at that time intended to commit suicide. It must have
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been in that stupor that the break occured. I am told that 
I drove my car to classroom building (A) and, hiding the 
gun, mounted the stairs to the roof. It was when I heard 
the man from the police talking to me that I realized what I 
was doing and threw down my gun. It took me several minutes 
after that to see that the door to the roof was locked. I 
then went over to the door and let the police in. As you 
can see from this description of the facts, I was not aware 
of the actions I performed and should not be considered lia­
ble for those actions.
Gordon:
Okay, that's good. Now for some of the questions that the 
prosecution is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were 'retaliating at the 
university'? Are those true?
J:
Well, I wish I had thought of doing something like that. 
The bastards in the administration need something to shake 
them up.
G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I was fired without reason. 
And I'm not sure people would believe me if I said I wanted
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to do it. I had thought about it - really. Maybe now some­
body will wonder why I was fired.
G:
Nope. Noone wants to know. Besides, the prosecution isn't 
looking to portray you as a victim of the school, they would 
rather show you as a drug addict who likes to shoot people. 
J:
Albright, alright, so I've never thought of shooting people 
for any reason. And I can't make jokes in court.
G:
That's right. It won't seem like a joke when it becomes tes­
timony. What about the possibility that you could have 
called a friend or someone to get you out of the situation? 
J:
Well I sure couldn't call anyone before I knew it would hap­
pen. And while it was happening I didn't know what I was 
doing.
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have 
avoided that.
J:
How? I told you that I wasn't in control!
G:
You know that, but you have to convince these people.
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Surely you value other people's lives enough that you could 
realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
J:
Yeah, sure I value people's lives. But I was under so much 
pressure about my financial situation that I couldn't think. 
And with all those drugs in me I couldn't think.
G:
Okay, just make sure the court realizes the extent of the 
pressure that you were under. (looks at watch) Its time. 
All you have to do is be calm and answer the questions as 
honestly as possible. If anyone asks a dangerous question,
I'11 catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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APPENDIX B
Dependent Variables for Coerced Condition
How much influence did Mike's fear of what the terrorists would do 
have over Mike's actions?
No Influence : : : : : : : :  Extreme!
at all Influence
How likely is it that Mike intended to do what he did?
Not at all : : : : : : : ; Extremely
Likely Likely
How possible is it that Mike 
the people?
: could have done something other than shoot
Not at all : : : : : : Extremely
Possible Possible
How free was Mike to decide to shoot the people?
Not at all : : : : : : : : Extremely
Free Free
How morally responsible was Mike for shooting the people?
Not at all : : : : : : : : Extremely
Responsible Responsible
How legally responsible was Mike for shooting the people?
Not at all : : : : : : : Extremely
Responsible Responsible
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How probable is it that Mike would do the same sort of thing again?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____  Extremely
Probable Probable
If you were a jury member, how likely would you be to convict Mike?
Not at all ____:____ :___ :_____:____ :____ :_____:_____:___ Extremely
Likely Likely
How severe a sentence would you recommend for Mike?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :_____ Extremely
Severe Severe
How responsible do you think Mike feels for shooting the people?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ Extremely
Responsible Responsible
Assuming that Mike had not been at all afraid of the terrorists, what 
the likelihood that Mike would have shot the people anyway?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :_____ Extremely
Likely Likely
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Dependent Variables for Drugs Condition
How much influence did the drugs Mike took actually 
have over Mike's actions?
No influence ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____  Extremely Much
at all Influence
How likely is it that Mike intended to do what he did?
Not at all : : : : : : : : Extremely
Likely Likely
How possible is it that Mike could have done something other than shoot 
the people?
Not at all : : : : : : : : Extremely
Possible Possible
How free was Mike to decide to shoot the people?
Not at all : : : : : : : ; Extremely
Free Free
How morally responsible was Mike for shooting the people?
Not at all : : : : : : ; Extremely
Responsible Responsible
How legally responsible was Mike for shooting the people?
Not at all : : : : : : : : Extremely
Responsible Responsible
How probable is it that Mike would do the same sort of thing again?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____  Extremely
Probable . Probable
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If you were a jury member, how likely would you be to convict Mike?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ Extremely
Likely Likely
How severe a sentence would you recommend for Mike?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :__________  :____  Extremely
Severe Severe
How responsible do you think Mike feels for shooting the people?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ Extremely
Responsible Responsible
Assuming that Mike had not taken any drugs at all, what is the 
likelihood that Mike would have shot the people anyway?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____  Extremely
Likely Likely
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Dependent Variables for Insane Condition
How much influence did Mike's emotional instability actually 
have over Mike's actions?
No Influence _________:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____  Extremely Much
at all Influence
How likely is it that Mike intended to do what he did?
Not at all ___ :____ :_____:____ :___ :_____:____ :____ :____  Extremely
Likely Likely
How possible is it that Mike could have done something other than shoot 
the people?
Not at all ___ :____ :_____:____ :___ :_____:____ :____ :____  Extremely
Possible Possible
How free was Mike to decide to shoot the people?
Not at_all ____: :_____:____ :___ :_____:____ :____ :____  Extremely
Free Free
How morally responsible was Mike for shooting the people?
Not at all ____:_____ :____ :____:_____:____ :_____:____  Extremely
Responsible Responsible
How legally responsible was Mike for shooting the people?
Not at all ____:____ :_____:____ :___ :_____:____ :____ :____  Extremely
Responsible Responsible
How probable is it that Mike would do the same sort of thing again?
Not at all ____:____ :_____:____ :___ :_____:____ :____ :____  Extremely
Probable Probable
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If you were a jury member, how likely would you be to convict Mike?
Not at all ____:____ :____:_____ :____:_____ :____:_____:___ Extremely
Likely Likely
How severe a sentence would you recommend for Mike?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____:_____ Extremely
Severe Severe
How responsible do you think Mike feels for shooting the people?
Not at all  :____ :_____ :____ :____ :____ :____ Extremely
Responsible Responsible
Assuming that Mike had not been at all emotionaly unstable, what is the 
likelihood that Mike would have shot the people anyway?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____  Extremely
Likely Likely
